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States-Laws, Regulations, and Methodology for Cal-
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in fact-finding, and rejected a well-established doc-
trine of justiciability-all of which go to the heart of
judicial restraint. In so doing, the Appellate Body in-
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facial challenges. Ten years after the Body's first re-
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I. INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization's dispute settlement regime
has been a "challenging experiment"' fraught with controversy. The
establishment of the WTO was a transformative event in the history
of international economic relations. But as the international trade re-
gime has transitioned from pragmatism to legalism, the process of
adjudication has come under intense scrutiny. If trade relations are
now determined by law rather than power or diplomacy, then the
success of such a system requires that the appointed adjudicators ren-
der binding decisions in a manner that assiduously adheres to agreed
procedural norms.
It now has been ten years since the WTO Appellate Body
rendered its first report in April 1996.2 Since that time the Appellate
Body has rendered over 75 reports. The distance of a decade allows
scholars to make certain predictive judgments about the likely direc-
tion of the WTO dispute settlement process. These reports represent
data points in a larger story about the exercise of judicial authority in
the WTO dispute settlement process. But few of those data points
will be as significant and controversial as the April 2006 Appellate
Body report of US-Laws, Regulations, and Methodology for Calcu-
lating Dumping Margins ("US-Zeroing").
3
The report in US-Zeroing provides a useful prism to reflect
on the current status of WTO dispute resolution. The decision under-
scores that the Appellate Body has staked out an ambitious role for
itself to shape WTO dispute resolution. That vision is one of a WTO
Dispute Settlement Body that does not shy away from political con-
troversy, that does not hesitate to articulate its own interpretation of
ambiguous WTO provisions, that arrogates power from the Member
States notwithstanding textual limitations on the Appellate Body's
role, and that curtails the discretionary authority of executive branch
agencies to exercise their delegated authority. In short, the US-
Zeroing decision belies the felicitous notion that the WTO dispute
resolution process embraces an approach of judicial restraint.
The topic at issue in US-Zeroing is arcane and technical. It
concerns the question of how an administrative agency calculates the
1. JEFF WAINCYMER, WTO LITIGATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF FORMAL DISPUTE
SErrLEMENT 36-37 (Cameron May ed., 2002).
2. Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
3. Appellate Body Report, United States-Laws, Regulations, and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins ("US-Zeroing'), WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr. 18, 2006)
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing].
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W
margin of dumping for the purposes of imposing antidumping duties.
The relevant provisions of the WTO Agreements define "dumping"
as occurring when a product is introduced into the commerce of an-
other country at a price that is less than its "normal value." 4 Apply-
ing that definition, the U.S. Department of Commerce's challenged
methodology found dumping if a product's export price was less than
its normal value and found no (or "zero") dumping if a product's ex-
port price was the same or higher than its normal value. 5 In other
words, Commerce identifies all instances of dumping and treats other
sales as "non-dumped." 6  When calculating an average dumping
margin, the amount of dumping is summed, with non-dumped sales
having a dumping amount of zero, and the sum is divided by the total
value of all imports.
The European Union challenged these U.S. practices before
the World Trade Organization, bringing both facial "as such" and "as
applied" challenges to the zeroing methodologies. 7 The WTO panel
ruled against the United States with respect to certain aspects of its
zeroing methodology but upheld the United States' approach with re-
spect to its use of zeroing for administrative reviews. On appeal, the
Appellate Body reversed, and ruled that the zeroing methodology ap-
plied by the United States in administrative reviews was inconsistent
with WTO obligations.
9
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. VI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I 1, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1994]; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. 2.1, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter
Antidumping Agreement], Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1A, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1133 (1994).
5. Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing, supra note 3, 47.
6. Terence P. Stewart, Antidumping, in 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A
NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 1383, 1540 (Terence P. Stewart ed., Kluwer Law &
Taxation Publishers 1993).
7. A facial or "as such" challenge is one made without regard to how the measure is
applied in any particular case. An "as applied" challenge is limited to the specific factual
circumstances of the case under review. A finding that a measure is incompatible "as such"
with a WTO obligation requires a broader corrective response by a Member State than an
"as applied" violation.
8. Panel Report, United States-Laws, Regulations, and Methodology for Calculating
Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), 7.223, WT/DS294/R (Oct. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Panel
Report, US-Zeroing] ("The Panel therefore finds that the United States did not act
inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement when . . .USDOC used a
methodology that involved asymmetrical comparisons between export price and normal
value and in which no account was taken of any amount by which export prices exceeded
normal value.").
9. See Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing, supra note 3, 132-35:
We move now to the question of whether the zeroing methodology applied by
the USDOC in the administrative reviews at issue is consistent with Article 9.3
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 ....
[Tlhe methodology applied by the USDOC in the administrative reviews at
[45:196
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This essay is not about substantive questions of antidumping
methodologies. It is about the application of procedural approaches
in the US-Zeroing case that serve to highlight potential problems
with Appellate Body decision-making. Those problems go to central
issues of judicial restraint, including concerns surrounding standards
of review, appellate fact-finding, and notions of justiciability and
ripeness. This essay will begin with an analysis of US-Zeroing's
approach in applying the specialized standard of review under the
Antidumping Agreement, arguing that it fails to adhere to the obliga-
tion of deference to permissible Member State interpretations of
WTO antidumping obligations. It then examines the fact-finding
procedures applied by the Appellate Body, which raise troubling
concerns about the Appellate Body's failure to confer deference to
the reasonable factual findings of Member States and WTO panels.
Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the Appellate Body's rejec-
tion of the mandatory/discretionary doctrine, a key tool that restricts
the jurisdictional authority of the WTO. The essay concludes that the
Appellate Body in US-Zeroing circumvented the particularized
standard of review required under the Antidumping Agreement, took
upon itself the unacceptable task of appellate fact-finding, and inap-
propriately expanded the authority of WTO panels to hear facial chal-
lenges of agency measures. Rather than adhere to an approach of
deference as required by the WTO commitments, the Appellate Body
engaged in de novo review of both the law and the facts to reach its
preferred result on zeroing.
I should emphasize that I have no particular policy preference
for the United States' zeroing methodology. The concern expressed
here is not whether a preferred trade result was effectuated by the
Appellate Body in US-Zeroing. On that issue I am agnostic. My
concern is whether the Appellate Body achieved this result in a man-
ner consistent with its authority under the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing (DSU).
issue results in amounts of assessed anti-dumping duties that exceed the foreign
producers' or exporters' margins of dumping. Yet, Article 9.3 clearly
stipulates that "the amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the
margin of dumping as established under Article 2." Similarly, Article VI:2 of
the GATT 1994 provides that "[in order to offset or prevent dumping, a
Member may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in
amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such product." In the light of
the above, we reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.288 and 8.1 (f) of the
Panel Report, that the United States did not act inconsistently with Article 9.3
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 in the
administrative reviews at issue, and find, instead, that the United States acted
inconsistently with those provisions.
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II. CIRCUMVENTING THE SPECIALIZED STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Specialized standard of review
The Antidumping Agreement has adopted an explicit provi-
sion that addresses the standard of review to be applied in reviewing
antidumping measures. Article 17.6(ii) provides that WTO panels
shall:
interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law. Where the panel finds that a
relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more
than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall
find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with
the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible
interpretations. 10
Application of this standard has been controversial. The ne-
gotiating history of this provision provides important clues to under-
stand its meaning.II During the final days of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the standard of review provision in
Article 17.6 was added to the final Antidumping Agreement at the in-
sistence of the United States. 12 When deciding on the standard of re-
view, the drafters looked to the Chevron deference applied by U.S.
federal courts. Under Chevron,'3 federal courts will accord signifi-
cant deference to an administrative agency's reasonable interpreta-
tion of a statutory provision. If the statute is unambiguous, a federal
court will strike down a conflicting agency interpretation. But if the
statute is ambiguous, courts must uphold the agency's interpretation
as long as it falls within the range of permissible constructions of the
statute. 14 The result is that courts will uphold interpretations that
they would not reach on their own, but that nonetheless reasonably
flow from the textual provision. At the heart of Chevron deference is
10. Gdinter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law, 26
HARv. INT'L L.J. 411, 416-18 (1985).
11. Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of
Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 199-201 (1996).
12. See GATT Partners Work Out Controversial Dumping Issue, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Dec. 14, 1993, at 2-3 (on the issue of the standard of review, where the U.S. did win
changes toward its position, the new text states that . . . where there is more than one
"permissible interpretation" of an antidumping provision, "the [GATT] panel shall find the
[domestic] authorities' measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one
of those permissible interpretations.").
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the commitment to defer to the policy choice of the administering au-
thority whenever the text will allow an interpretation consistent with
that choice. In such cases, "judges-who have no constituency-
have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who
do."
15
While the analogy is not perfect, 16 the basic import of the
suggestion was that reasonable interpretations by Member States
should be upheld by WTO panels. 17 The final language adopted in
Article 17.6 embraces this approach, with slight variations. The
drafters replaced the word "reasonable" with "permissible" and
added an additional sentence that requires interpretations to be in ac-
cordance with customary rules of international law. 18 In essence, the
language of Article 17.6 incorporates administrative law principles
analogous to Chevron deference 19 while also adopting traditional in-
ternational law norms regarding treaty interpretation, i.e., the inter-
pretive methodology reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.
20
The confluence of these two interpretive methodologies has
been fraught with difficulties. While the first sentence of Article
17.6(ii) requires recourse to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Con-
vention to determine the meaning of a provision of the Antidumping
Agreement, the second .sentence presupposes that there may be more
than one permissible interpretation.2 1 At a minimum, this leaves lit-
tle doubt that Article 17.6 requires a special standard of review. If
Article 17.6(ii) is to have meaning, the general approach applied in
15. Id. at 866.
16. See Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Judicial Review in the United States and in the WTO:
Some Similarities and Differences, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 587, 601-05 (2004).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 602 (citing language of Article 17.6 and explaining its relation to Chevron
deference).
19. See William J. Clinton, Transmission of Legislation and Related Document to
Implement Agreements Resulting From GATT Uruguay Round-Message From the
President of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 148 (1994) ("Article 17.6 contains
a special standard of review, which is analogous to the deferential standard applied by U.S.
courts in reviewing actions by Commerce and the Commission."). The replacement of the
word "reasonable" with "permissible" should not alter this conclusion. Chevron itself uses
language of "permissible" constructions of statutory language, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843,
and numerous decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court apply Chevron deference while referring
to "permissible interpretations" of the administrative agency. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon;
126 S.Ct. 904, 936 (2006); Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45 (2002);
Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 21 (2000); MCI Telecomm.
v. Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227 (1994); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 (1992).
20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, para. l(a), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (1969).
21. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Nicholas Lockhart, Standard of Review in WTO Law, 7
J. INT'L ECON. L. 491, 499 (2004).
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other contexts cannot be coterminous with the special approach ap-
plied under the Antidumping Agreement.
Recognizing this textual distinction, the standard of review is
not only comparable to the domestic approach borrowed from U.S.
administrative law, but also may reflect the international law princi-
ple of the "margin of appreciation." 22 That doctrine recognizes that
"international courts should grant national authorities a certain degree
of deference" while still authorizing international courts "to review
whether national decisions are reasonable." 23 The particular advan-
tage of this approach is that the margin of appreciation is an interpre-
tive device accepted as an international norm appropriate for use by
particular international tribunals. 24 As such, by incorporating the in-
ternational law doctrine of the margin of appreciation, the require-
ments of the second sentence of 17.6(ii) are fully consistent with the
first sentence's mandate to apply customary international law rules of
interpretation. The second sentence of 17.6(ii) simply embraces a
well-recognized interpretive approach in international law which re-
quires judicial deference to national authorities under certain circum-
stances.
Thus, the Antidumping Agreement creates a scheme of defer-
ence to Member State decision-making. The agreement establishes
broad rules, but pursuant to Article 17.6 it does not require Member
States to implement identical antidumping systems. The Antidump-
ing Agreement is not comprehensive, and policy choices remain
available to Member States to implement different remedies for trade
violations within textual constraints. As with the margin of apprecia-
tion principle applied by the European Court of Human Rights, the
22. Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International
Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907, 909-10 (2005); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring,
WTO Dispute Settlement and Competition Law: Views From the Perspective of the
Appellate Body's Experience, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1505, 1538 (2003); James Cameron &
Kevin R. Gray, Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 50
INT'L CoMP. L.Q. 248, 258 (2001); John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate:
United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 157, 182 (1997). But see MATTHIAS OESCH, STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN WTO
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 51-54 (2003).
23. Shany, supra note 22, at 910.
24. In particular the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") and the European
Court of Justice have robust application of this deferential standard of review. See Shany,
supra note 22, at 926-27; HOWARD CHARLES YoUROw, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION
DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996). The
ECHR has described the "margin of appreciation" as a doctrine of deference to national
authorities for permissible interpretations that are reconcilable with treaty obligations. See
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 49 (1976) (explaining that "[t]he
domestic margin of appreciation thus goes hand in hand with a European supervision" and
"the Court... is empowered to give the final ruling on whether a 'restriction' or 'penalty' is
reconcilable" with a treaty obligation).
[4 5:19 6
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WTO rules authorize different national authorities in different Mem-
ber States to reach different decisions regarding the application of the
international obligation contained in the Antidumping Agreement.25
One might also say that this approach of deference is consis-
tent with the broader general international law principle that every-
thing that is not prohibited under international law is permitted.26 As
the Permanent Court of International Justice explained in the land-
mark Lotus case, "[r]estrictions upon the independence of States can-
not... be presumed.... Far from laying down a general prohibition,
... [international law] leaves ... [States] a wide measure of discre-
tion, which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as re-
gards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles
which it regards as best and most suitable." 27 International treaties
impose upon States certain mutually agreed-upon boundaries. But
beyond those constraints the choice of action remains with the State.
Whatever may be the proper theoretical articulation of the
standard, it is clear that the WTO Appellate Body has understood Ar-
ticle 17.6(ii) to require a melding of two interpretive methodologies.
As the Appellate Body stated in US-Hot-Rolled Steel,
[p]anels are obliged to determine whether a measure
rests upon an interpretation of the relevant provisions
of the Antidumping Agreement which is permissible
under the rules of treaty interpretation in Articles 31
and 32 of the Vienna Convention .... [A] panel shall
find that a measure is in conformity with the Anti-
dumping Agreement if it rests upon one permissible
interpretation of that Agreement.2
25. Shany, supra note 22, at 909-10.
26. The S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19; cf id. at 34
(dissenting opinion of Judge Loder).
27. Id. at 18-19.
28. Appellate Body Report, United States-Anti-Dumping Measure on Certain Hot-
Rolled Steel Products from Japan, 60, 62, WT/DS 1 84/AB/R (July 24, 2001) [hereinafter
Appellate Body Report, US-Hot-Rolled Steel]. Paragraphs 59-62 are the key provisions,
and they provide in relevant part:
59. Th[e] second sentence of Article 17.6(ii) presupposes that application of the
rules of treaty interpretation in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention
could give rise to, at least, two interpretations of some provisions of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, which, under that Convention, would both be
"permissible interpretations." In that event, a measure is deemed to be in
conformity with the Anti-Dumping Agreement "if it rests upon one of those
permissible interpretations."
60. It follows that, under Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
panels are obliged to determine whether a measure rests upon an interpretation
of the relevant provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement which is
permissible under the rules of treaty interpretation in Articles 31 and 32 of the
Vienna Convention.. In other words, a permissible interpretation is one which
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In short, the task of WTO panels is to examine a Member State's in-
terpretation and assess if its interpretation is permissible using the
rules of the Vienna Convention. If a provision admits of more than
one interpretation, and the Member State's is one such interpretation,
the measure should be construed as conforming to the requirements
of the Antidumping Agreement.
That, at least, is the theory behind this specialized standard of
review. In practice, applying this approach has been problematic.
One prominent critic has described the provision as a "dead letter."
29
Another has argued that "[i]t is difficult to identify any issue in any
of the cases in which this special standard has produced an outcome
different from that which would have prevailed had there been no Ar-
ticle 17.6. ''3 And in no case has the application of Article 17.6(ii)
been more difficult than in the zeroing cases. Even otherwise strong
proponents of the Appellate Body's approach to antidumping meas-
ures have conceded that its approach to zeroing has been a notable
instance of judicial overreaching.
3 1
is found to be appropriate after application of the pertinent rules of the Vienna
Convention. We observe that the rules of treaty interpretation in Articles 31
and 32 of the Vienna Convention apply to any treaty, in any field of public
international law, and not just to the WTO agreements. These rules of treaty
interpretation impose certain common disciplines upon treaty interpreters,
irrespective of the content of the treaty provision being examined and
irrespective of the field of international law concerned....
62. Finally, although the second sentence of Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement imposes obligations on panels which are not found in the
DSU, we see Article 17.6(ii) as supplementing, rather than replacing, the DSU,
and Article 11 in particular. Article 11 requires panels to make an "objective
assessment of the matter" as a whole. Thus, under the DSU, in examining
claims, panels must make an "objective assessment" of the legal provisions at
issue, their "applicability" to the dispute, and the "conformity" of the measures
at issue with the covered agreements. Nothing in Article 17.6(ii) of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement suggests that panels examining claims under that
Agreement should not conduct an "objective assessment" of the legal
provisions of the Agreement, their applicability to the dispute, and the
conformity of the measures at issue with the Agreement. Article 17.6(ii) simply
adds that a panel shall find that a measure is in conformity with the Anti-
Dumping Agreement if it rests upon one permissible interpretation of that
Agreement. (emphasis omitted).
29. John Greenwald, WTO Dispute Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law
Legislation?, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 113, 117 (2003).
30. Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO
Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 109, 118
(2002); see also V6izquez, supra note 16, at 603 (noting that "the AB treatment of Article
17.6 thus far suggests that the attempt to import Chevron deference into WTO adjudication
has not been entirely successful, as the AB has resisted the standard").
31. James P. Durling, Deference, But Only When Due: WTO Review of Antidumping
Measures, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 125, 136 (2003).
[45:196
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B. Standard of review in US-Zeroing
The controversy over the proper application of Article 17.6 is
clearly evident in the US-Zeroing report. Indeed, in its decision the
Appellate Body addressed the standard of review on only one occa-
sion, and even then it appeared as an afterthought. The Appellate
Body stated that, in applying Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, the Appellate Body
has been "mindful of the standard of review set out in Article 17.6(ii)
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. '32 But it concluded that those pro-
visions, "when interpreted in accordance with customary rules of in-
terpretation of public international law, as required by Article
17.6(ii), do not ... allow the use of the methodology applied by the
United States .... ,33 It reached this conclusion because the method-
ology applied by the United States resulted in amounts of anti-
dumping duties assessed that exceeded the margin of dumping, con-
trary to Article VI:2 and Article 9.3, based on the Appellate Body's
interpretation.
34
The critical interpretive move for the Appellate Body in US-
Zeroing was to conclude that dumping margins only exist for the
"product as a whole"-a term found nowhere in the agreements at is-
sue.35 The Appellate Body concluded that if the margin of dumping
is established based on multiple comparisons of the export price to
normal value, then the results of all these price comparisons must be
aggregated to establish the margins of dumping for the "product un-
der investigation as a whole." 3  According to the Appellate Body,
investigating authorities were "required to aggregate the results of all
of the multiple comparisons, including those where the export price
exceeds the normal value." 37 In other words, the Appellate Body
found that investigating authorities could not treat non-dumped sales
32. Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing, supra note 3, 7 134.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 7 125-30. The Appellate Body first explained that dumping margins must
be calculated for the "product as a whole" in the EC-Bed Linen dispute and then relied on
that interpretation in US-Softwood Lumber. Appellate Body Report, EC-Antidumping
Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen From India, 53, WT/DS141/AB/R (Mar. 1,
2001) ("[W]hatever the method used to calculate the margins of dumping, in our view, these
margins must be, and can only be, established for the product under investigation as a
whole."); Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Dumping Determination on
Softwood Lumber From Canada, T 96, WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11, 2004) [hereinafter
Appellate Body Report, US--Softwood Lumber] ("[A]s with dumping, 'margins of dumping'
can be found only for the product under investigation as a whole, and cannot be found to
exist for a product type, model, or category of that product.").
36. Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing, supra note 3, TT 127-28.
37. Id. T 127.
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LA W
as non-dumped but rather had to create a category of sales with
"negative" dumping margins which would be used to reduce the total
dumping found. It thus found that "[i]nvestigating authorities are re-
quired to ensure that the total amount of anti-dumping duties col-
lected on the entries of a product from a given exporter shall not ex-
ceed the margin of dumping established for that exporter."
38
While the determination that margins must be calculated
based on the "product as a whole" may well -be a permissible inter-
pretation of some treaty provisions, it is exceedingly difficult to con-
clude that it is the only permissible interpretation. The Antidumping
Agreement expressly contemplates that in some circumstances mar-
gins will be determined without reference to the product as a
whole.39 The second sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping
Agreement states that margins may be established on the basis of
"individual export transactions if the authorities find a pattern of ex-
port prices which differ significantly among different purchasers, re-
gions or time periods." 40 Calculating margins based on individual
transactions that target particular purchasers, regions, or time periods
is not a calculation based on the product as a whole. The Appellate
Body's interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the individual
transaction approach contemplated when calculating targeted dump-
ing. Indeed, it would seem that the Appellate Body's interpretation
has rendered Article 2.4.2 of little utility, offering exporters renewed
incentives to engage in targeted, geographic, or sporadic dumping.
41
Significantly, the Panel felt there was no ambiguity on this
question, arguing that the United States' interpretation was the only
logical one.
38. Id. 130.
39. For the United States' argument in this regard, see Appellate Body Report, US-
Zeroing, supra note 3, 44, 143-50.
40. The Antidumping Agreement, supra note 4, in Article 2.4.2, states:
Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4, the
existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall normally
be established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value
with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a
comparison of normal value and export prices on a transaction to transaction
basis. A normal value established on a weighted average basis may be
compared to prices of individual export transactions if the authorities find a
pattern of export prices which differ significantly among different purchasers,
regions or time periods, and if an explanation is provided as to why such
differences cannot be taken into account appropriately by the use of a weighted
average to weighted average or transaction to transaction comparison.
41. Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2004, 22 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 99, 211 (2005) ("[Z]eroing may be a useful tool to combat targeted dumping (i.e.,
dumping in certain markets of an importing country, but not other markets), geographic
dumping (i.e., dumping in certain locations of the country, but not other places in that
country), or sporadic dumping (i.e., dumping for certain periods, but not other periods).").
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An interpretation of zeroing as by definition unfair in
all circumstances, such that even in these circum-
stances a Member would be required to offset the (pat-
tern of) below-normal-value export prices by others
above normal value, would deny the second sentence
the very function for which it was created .... We
cannot interpret the Agreement in a manner that de-
nies a provision the role for which it was created and
in fact renders that provision without effect. Accord-
ingly, we must conclude that Article 2.4 does not con-
sider zeroing to be unfair and thus prohibited in all
circumstances, but rather recognizes that in some
cases zeroing may be appropriate in order to accu-
rately reflect the existence of dumping by an ex-
porter.
42
If the Panel concluded that the text of the Antidumping Agreement
compelled the result articulated by the United States, it is difficult to
understand how the Appellate Body could reach the conclusion that
there was not sufficient ambiguity in the text such that the United
States' position was not at least a permissible interpretation of the
treaty obligation. This conclusion is underscored by the longstanding
practice of zeroing by Member States. Indeed, two GATT panels re-
jected claims by Japan and Brazil that zeroing was inconsistent with
the 1979 Antidumping Code.
43
Zeroing was also discussed in some detail in the negotiations
of the WTO Antidumping Agreement. Some delegates, who were
opposed to zeroing, argued that "negative" dumping transactions
should be considered when calculating the dumping margin, while
others, who favored zeroing, argued that disregarding negative mar-
gins was necessary to address targeted dumping on a particular ac-
count, product line, region, or time period.44 Those delegates who
42. Panel Report, US-Zeroing, supra note 8, 7.266 (emphasis in original).
43. Panel Report, EC-Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton Yarn
from Brazil, 502, ADP/137 (July 4, 1995); Panel Report, EC-Anti-Dumping Duties on
Audio Tapes in Cassettes Originating in Japan, 360, ADP/136 (Apr. 28, 1995).
44. Stewart, supra note 6, at 1540. Indeed, Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore argued
during the Uruguay Round negotiations that "negative dumping margins" (when export
prices are equal to or greater than normal value) should be accounted for in calculating
dumping margins. See Communication from Japan, Proposals on the Anti-Dumping Code,
item 11.1(4), MTN.GNG/NG8/W/11 (Sept. 28, 1987); Communication from Japan,
Background Notes to Japan's Proposals on the Anti-Dumping Code, item 1.4(3),
MTN.GNG/NG8/W/30 (June 20, 1988); Communication from the Delegation of Singapore,
Proposed Elements for a Framework for Negotiations Principles and Objectives for Anti-
Dumping Rules, item 1I.E, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/55 (Oct. 13, 1989); Communication from the
Delegation of Hong Kong, Principles and Purposes of Anti-Dumping Provisions, item iv,
MTN.GNG/NG8/W/46 (July 3, 1989); Communication from the Delegation of Hong Kong,
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favored the use of zeroing argued that negative dumping transactions
could mask targeted behavior by allowing producers to receive credit
for negative margins, something akin to "arguing that a driver should
not be found guilty of speeding if, along other portions of the road,
he was driving under the speed limit."45 As a result, none of the draft
texts included any reference to "negative" dumping margins or zero-
ing; nor did the final 1994 Antidumping Agreement. As John
Greenwald has noted, "zeroing was at the time the Anti-dumping
Agreement was negotiated, and remains, a common practice in anti-
dumping regimes around the world."-
47
The Appellate Body in US-Zeroing avoided the textual prob-
lems identified by the Panel by shifting the emphasis from Article
2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement to Article VI of GATT 1994. It
did so by relying on language from the previous Appellate Body de-
cision in US-Softwood Lumber.48 The Appellate Body noted that
although the Appellate Body in US-Softwood Lumber dealt with a
zeroing challenge in the context of an original investigation pursuant
to Article 2.4.2, that report stated unambiguously that the terms
"dumping" and "margins of dumping" in Article VI apply to the
product under investigation as a whole. This was a "finding based
not only on Article 2.4.2 ... but also on the context found in Article
2.1 of the Antidumping Agreement."49 But, of course, the Appellate
Body in US-Softwood Lumber was interpreting "dumping" and
"margins of dumping" in an "integrated manner" with specific refer-
ence to and in light of dumping margins under Article 2.4.2.50 The
Amendments to the Anti-Dumping Code, 14, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/51/Add.1 (Dec. 22,
1989); Communication from the Delegation of Hong Kong, Amendments to the Anti-
Dumping Code, item 4(b), MTN.GNG/NG8/W/5 1/Add.2 (Mar. 21, 1990).
45. Stewart, supra note 6, at 1540.
46. Indeed, two former assistant secretaries of the U.S. Department of Commerce who
served as principal U.S. negotiators for antidumping rules in the Uruguay Round wrote to
the Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative to object to the trend in WTO
decisions on zeroing. They pointed out that no reference to zeroing or an offset for
"negative dumping margins" was ever included in any draft text or the final Antidumping
Agreement because the United States had strongly opposed all proposals to prohibit zeroing
or require an offset for "negative dumping margins." Former Commerce Officials Call for
Stronger Stance on Remedy Laws, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June 24, 2005, at 15.
47. Greenwald, supra note 29, at 118.
48. Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing, supra note 3, 9 125-27.
49. Id. 126 (citing Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber, supra note 35,
102).
50. Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber, supra note 35, $ 85. The
Appellate Body's reliance in US-Zeroing on its previous decision in EC-Bed Linen is
even more tenuous, as EC-Bed Linen deals quite explicitly with dumping and margins of
dumping within the context of Article 2.4.2, not Article VI of GATT 1994. Compare
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, 46-66, WT/DS141/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001) to Appellate
Body Report, US-Zeroing, supra note 3, 126.
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analysis in that case centered on those terms "as used in Article 2.4.2
of the Antidumping Agreement."
5 1
While the Appellate Body in US-Softwood Lumber found
that Article 2.4.2 prohibited certain methodologies in the investiga-
tion phase of an antidumping proceeding, the question in US-
Zeroing was quite distinct. The issue in US-Zeroing was whether
such a finding should be extended to other phases notwithstanding
the fact that Article 2.4.2 by its terms applies only to the establish-
ment of margins of dumping "during the investigation phase."
Rather than wrestle with these difficulties, the Appellate Body fo-
cused exclusively on its own prior interpretations of the definition of
dumping in GATT 1994 Article VI: I and Antidumping Agreement
Article 2.1-provisions that WTO Members had not modified in the
Uruguay Round, that had been interpreted by a 1960 Group of Ex-
perts as permitting the determination of dumping for each importa-
tion of a product," and that had been interpreted by two GATT pan-
els to permit zeroing. 53 Obviously, it is not the text that has changed
over the decades, but rather the meaning attributed to it by the Appel-
late Body in US-Zeroing. One would have thought that the absence
of change in the text of the renegotiated Antidumping Agreement
would have led to a presumption that behavior that was previously
sanctioned would remain so.
The point here is not whether the Appellate Body's conclu-
sions regarding zeroing find any support in the text or the negotiating
history. The issue is whether the Appellate Body has taken seriously
its obligation to assess Member State action based on a deferential
standard of review. The United States in US-Zeroing stressed the
applicability of the deferential standard of review. The Panel had
concluded that the text of the Antidumping Agreement compelled the
result articulated by the United States. 5  But the Appellate Body
51. Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber, supra note 35, 90.
52. The Second Report of the Group of Experts on Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duties, 8, L/1141 (adopted May 27, 1960), GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.), at 194, 195
(1961).
53. See Communication from the United States, United States-Laws, Regulations, and
Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing'), 22, 33-35, WT/DS294/18
(June 19, 2006) [hereinafter U.S. Communication of June 19, 2006]; Communication of the
United States, United States-Laws, Regulations, and Methodology for Calculating Dumping
Margins ("Zeroing'), 19, WT/DS294/16 (May 17, 2006) [hereinafter U.S. Communication
of May 17, 2006].
54. Indeed, the Panel in the US-Zeroing dispute and the Article 21.5 panel in US-
Softwood Lumber had just found that, with the exception of investigations using the average-
to-average comparison methodology, zeroing reflected a permissible interpretation of the
Antidumping Agreement. See U.S. Communication of June 19, 2006, supra note 53, 36;
Panel Report, United States-Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from
Canada-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, 5.28-29, 5.66, WT/DS264/RW
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nonetheless failed to recognize the possibility of more than one per-
missible interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Antidumping
Agreement, including the one reflected in longstanding practice of
the United States.5  As one commentator discussing the US-
Zeroing case put it, "the Appellate Body's reasoning on [zeroing]
does not seem very convincing.... This is especially so given the
special ... standard of review set out in Article 17.6(ii)."
56
III. FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS ON APPEAL
The applicable standard of review also addresses factual de-
terminations. This raises two issues. First, what is the standard of
review applied by WTO panels in reviewing factual determinations
of Member State authorities? And second, what are the limits on the
power of review by the Appellate Body of factual determinations of
the WTO panels?
A. Standard of reviewforfactual determinations
Article 17.6(i) of the Antidumping Agreement provides that
"in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine
whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and
whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If
the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was un-
biased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a dif-
ferent conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned. ' 57 This




55. Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing, supra note 3, 47.
56. TradeLaw.net Dispute Settlement Commentary, Appellate Body Report: United
States-Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"),
at 18, available at http://worldtradelaw.net/dsc/ab/us-zeroing(dsc)(ab).pdf.
57. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 4, art. 17.6 (i).
58. According to Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 21, at 503-04, Article 17.6(i):
seeks to prevent the panel from rejecting factual findings made at the national
level just because the panel prefers an alternative finding. Indeed, under this
provision, the focus of the panel's review should not be on the facts
themselves, but rather on whether the process of establishing those facts was
"proper". If that process was "proper", the facts found as a result of the
process should be accepted, "even though the panel might have reached a
different conclusion". There is, therefore, no de novo review and panels cannot
substitute their own analysis for that of the national authority. Only in cases
where there is, perhaps, a manifest or egregious impropriety is a panel likely to
interfere with a national authority's establishment of the facts under Article
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But Article 17.6(i) also underscores the role of WTO panels,
as distinct from the Appellate Body, in making and reviewing factual
determinations. It is the panel that determines whether the Member
State authorities properly establish the facts. 59 The Appellate Body
in US-Hot-Rolled Steel has interpreted this to require panels to as-
sess the facts and undertake an active review or examination of the
pertinent facts.60 But this only underscores the affirmative duty of
panels to make factual findings consistent with the general mandate
of Article 11 of the DSU and the specific mandate of Article 17.6(i)
of the Antidumping Agreement.
61
17.6(i). In short, the word "proper" carries with it a considerable margin of
discretion.
59. OESCH, supra note 22, at 165.
60. Appellate Body Report, US-Hot-Rolled Steel, supra note 28, 55-56:
In considering Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, it is important
to bear in mind the different roles of panels and investigating authorities.
Investigating authorities are charged, under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, with
making factual determinations relevant to their overall determination of
dumping and injury. Under Article 17.6(i), the task of panels is simply to
review the investigating authorities' "establishment" and "evaluation" of the
facts. To that end, Article 17.6(i) requires panels to make an "assessment of the
facts". The language of this phrase reflects closely the obligation imposed on
panels under Article 11 of the DSU to make an "objective assessment of the
facts". Thus, the text of both provisions requires panels to "assess" the facts
and this, in our view, clearly necessitates an active review or examination of
the pertinent facts. Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement does not
expressly state that panels are obliged to make an assessment of the facts which
is "objective". However, it is inconceivable that Article 17.6(i) should require
anything other than that panels make an objective "assessment of the facts of
the matter". In this respect, we see no "conflict" between Article 17.6(i) of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 11 of the DSU. Article 17.6(i) of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement also states that the panel is to determine, first,
whether the investigating authorities' "establishment of the facts was proper"
and, second, whether the authorities' "evaluation of those facts was unbiased
and objective" (emphasis added). Although the text of Article 17.6(i) is
couched in terms of an obligation on panels-panels "shall" make these
determinations-the provision, at the same time, in effect defines when
investigating authorities can be considered to have acted inconsistently with
the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the course of their "establishment" and
"evaluation" of the relevant facts. In other words, Article 17.6(i) sets forth the
appropriate standard to be applied by panels in examining the WTO-
consistency of the investigating authorities' establishment and evaluation of
the facts under other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Thus, panels
must assess if the establishment of the facts by the investigating authorities was
proper and if the evaluation of those facts by those authorities was unbiased
and objective. If these broad standards have not been met, a panel must hold
the investigating authorities' establishment or evaluation of the facts to be
inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
61. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1233 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU] ("The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its
responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel
should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective
assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant
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The specific role of WTO panels-as compared to that of the
Appellate Body-is also underscored by the general admonition in
the Dispute Settlement Understanding that an appeal to the Appellate
Body "shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report
and legal interpretations developed by the panel."' 62 As an appellate
review body, the record of the panel proceedings forms the basis of
review. 63 The limited grounds for review place the WTO Appellate
Body in the distinct role of reviewing legal questions, and they cir-
cumscribe the authority of the Appellate Body to procure factual in-
formation beyond the factual findings established by the panel. As
one commentator put it, "[i]n completing the analysis there is ... a
significant difference between relying on factual findings by the
Panel and facts placed before a Panel by way of evidence of the par-
ties.64 Only in the first instance has there been an adjudicatory re-
view and evaluation of those facts."
65
B. Factual determinations in US-Zeroing
In US-Zeroing, the critical factual question arose whether
the United States had a policy on zeroing that represented an unwrit-
ten rule or norm. The panel determined that zeroing was an estab-
lished methodology inconsistent with WTO obligations. It based its
conclusions on three pieces of evidence: (1) lines of computer code
included in the computer programs used by the Department of Com-
merce in antidumping proceedings; (2) a response by the United
States to a panel question; and (3) the historical practice of zeroing
that was utilized by the United States and other signatories.
66
The Appellate Body took a different approach. It referenced
some of the evidence that formed the basis of the panel's findings,
but went further, relying upon other evidence that was merely "be-
fore the panel." Specifically, the Appellate Body relied upon (1) the
standard programs used by the Department of Commerce; (2) a re-
covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.").
62. Id. art. 17.6.
63. Appellate Body, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/5, R. 25
(Jan. 4, 2005).
64. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, 151, WT/DS 1 66/AB/R (Dec.
22, 2000) ("In view of the distinction between the respective roles of the Appellate Body and
panels, we have taken care to emphasize that a panel's appreciation of the evidence falls, in
principle, 'within the scope of the panel's discretion as the trier offact.').
65. WAINCYMER, supra note 1, at 744.
66. Panel Report, US-Zeroing, supra note 8, 7.103 & n.200.
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sponse by the United States to a panel question; (3) Department of
Commerce determinations in specific cases; (4) expert opinions re-
garding the use and content of the zeroing methodology; (5) the Anti-
Dumping Manual; and (6) oral testimony by the United States at the
opening hearing.67 Significantly, only the first two of these six
sources were used by the panel in its findings, and the panel ex-
pressly avoided one of the remaining four.
The difference between the factual evidence relied upon by
the panel and the evidence relied upon by the Appellate Body is
noteworthy. Obviously, evidence is of critical importance in an "as
such" challenge, particularly in the absence of a written document es-
tablishing the purported rule or norm.68 The Appellate Body empha-
sized that an "as such" challenge requires a complaining party to
"clearly establish, through arguments and supporting evidence" the
content of a rule or norm, its attribution to the Member State, and its
general applicability. 69 But having imposed that high threshold, it is
also obvious that the Appellate Body was uncomfortable with the in-
complete factual record presented by the panel.7 ° It criticized the
panel for failing to articulate the criteria for bringing an "as such"
challenge, for failing to distinguish between the existence and consis-
tency of the challenged measure, and for failing to articulate its ulti-
mate conclusions regarding the consistency of the zeroing methodol-
ogy.7 1  The Appellate Body also re-characterized the Panel's
findings, arguing without support in the Panel's report that what was
before the Panel formed the basis of their factual findings. 72
67. Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing, supra note 3, 201-02; see also U.S.
Communication of May 17, 2006, supra note 53, 10-13.
68. Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing, supra note 3, 1 198.
69. Id.:
In our view, when bringing a challenge against such a "rule or norm" that
constitutes a measure of general and prospective application, a complaining
party must clearly establish, through arguments and supporting evidence, at
least that the alleged "rule or norm" is attributable to the responding Member;
its precise content; and indeed, that it does have general and prospective
application. It is only if the complaining party meets this high threshold, and
puts forward sufficient evidence with respect to each of these elements, that a
panel would be in a position to find that the "rule or norm" may be challenged,
as such. This evidence may include proof of the systematic application of the
challenged "rule or norm". Particular rigour is required on the part of a panel
to support a conclusion as to the existence of a "rule or norm" that is not
expressed in the form of a written document. A panel must carefully examine
the concrete instrumentalities that evidence the existence of the purported "rule




72. Id. fT 213 ("The Panel had before it evidence including standard computer programs
used by the USDOC to calculate margins of dumping, the Anti-Dumping Manual, expert
opinions, and the Standard Zeroing Procedures. We therefore cannot agree with the United
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With the factual findings of the Panel wanting, the Appellate
Body had few good options. Lacking the power to remit a decision
to the panel, it decided against the normal approach of declining to
rule on the matter in the absence of sufficient factual findings. In-
stead, it chose to modify the panel's factual findings and reach a legal
conclusion based on those modified findings. In essence, the Appel-
late Body had to complete the factual analysis in order to conclude
that zeroing was the norm or a rule that was inconsistent with Article
2.4.2. It stated that "[n]otwithstanding the[] shortcomings in the
Panel's reasoning, we believe that, in the specific circumstances of
this case, the evidence before the Panel was sufficient" to identify the
content of the zeroing methodology, its attribution to the United
States, and its general application.'" In so doing, it undertook an
evaluation of the evidence in the factual record without the benefit of
the Panel's factual findings.
This is problematic. The normal approach is for the Appel-
late Body to complete its analysis "solely on the basis of factual find-
ings made by the Panel and uncontested facts in the Panel record."'74
As one noted commentator has put it, any other approach would
place "the Appellate Body in an invidious position . . . . If... it
seeks to make factual findings from its legal conclusions, it is going
beyond its express mandate in Article 17.6 [of the DSU] to the effect
that 'an appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the Panel
Report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel'. . . . As
the Appellate Body emphasized in US-Hot Rolled Steel, the Appel-
late Body can only complete the analysis "if the factual findings of
the panel, or the undisputed facts in the panel record, provide us with
a sufficient basis to do so."
76
By concluding that the panel's factual findings were insuffi-
cient and then looking at evidence that did not serve as the basis for
the Panel's factual determinations, 77 and which was contested by the
parties,78 and going so far as to rely on evidence the Panel expressly
avoided,79 the Appellate Body in US-Zeroing undertook the task of
States that the Panel analysis 'relie[d] on nothing more than the fact that the USDOC has
engaged in zeroing in the past using computers.").
73. Id. 204.
74. Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
Exportation of Dairy Products, 98, WTO/DS 1 03/AB/R (Oct. 13, 1999) (emphasis added).
75. WAINCYMER, supra note 1, at 744.
76. Appellate Body Report, US-Hot-Rolled Steel, supra note 28, 235.
77. See Panel Report, US-Zeroing, supra note 8, 7.104 ("[T]he evidence before us
indicates that zeroing methodology represents a well-established and well-defined norm and
it is possible based on this evidence to identity the content of that norm.").
78. See U.S. Communication of May 17, 2006, supra note 53, 24-25.
79. Panel Report, US-Zeroing, supra note 8, 7.107 ("The panel considers that it not
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completing the factual findings of the panel rather than reviewing the
legal interpretations that developed from the panel's factual findings.
This is unprecedented. Previously, the Appellate Body has deter-
mined that "[g]iven the lack of factual findings by the Panel regard-
ing the [zeroing] methodology," the Appellate Body lacked "a suffi-
cient factual basis to complete the analysis" and was "unable to rule
on whether the United States acted inconsistently" with the Anti-
dumping Agreement.
80
The Appellate Body's approach raises serious questions about
its role with regard to factual evidence. If disputed facts are not es-
tablished by a WTO panel, then the Appellate Body is doing some-
thing quite important and worrisome with respect to factual evidence
in the record. It is choosing particular facts as the basis for Appellate
Body factual findings, including factual evidence expressly ignored
by the panel as well as expert opinion provided by one of the parties.
At the same time it discounts other facts in the record and ignores or
overrides the factual findings of the WTO Panel. This approach
should give one pause if one takes seriously the limited role of the
Appellate Body in the dispute settlement process.
In sum, the Appellate Body's approach in US-Zeroing with
respect to deference on factual findings is troubling. Troubling be-
cause the initial Panel's assessment of the facts under the Antidump-
ing Agreement requires deference to the objective and unbiased fac-
tual findings of Member State authorities.8 1  Doubly troubling
because the Appellate Body's assessment of the facts under the DSU
requires deference to the factual findings of the WTO panels.82 As
such, the WTO agreements require double deference to factual find-
ings below. But the Appellate Body displayed no such deference. It
undertook de novo review of the evidence presented to the panel and
reached factual conclusions on the basis of that evidence. On the ba-
necessary to make a finding on whether the Anti-Dumping Procedures Manual is WTO
inconsistent as such."). Indeed, the failure to consider this evidence formed the basis of an
appeal by the European Union. See Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing, supra note 3,
223-25.
80. Appellate Body Report, United States-Sunset Review of Antidumping Duties on
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, T 138, WT/DS244/AB/R (Dec.
15, 2003) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, US-Sunset Review].
81. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 4, art. 17.6(i):
In its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether
the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether their
evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of
the facts was proper and evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though
the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be
overturned.
82. See DSU, supra note 61, art. 17.6 ("An appeal shall be limited to issues of law
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.").
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sis of this review it concluded that there was sufficient factual evi-
dence of the precise content, attribution, and general application of
the zeroing methodology. In making its own factual findings based
on evidence in the record, the Appellate Body improperly over-
reached.
IV. REJECTION OF THE MANDATORY/DISCRETIONARY DOCTRINE
A third and final important problem with the Appellate
Body's US-Zeroing report is its apparent rejection of the manda-
tory/discretionary doctrine. That doctrine is the principal mechanism
for the WTO dispute resolution process to incorporate notions of
ripeness. 83 The Appellate Body in US-Zeroing appeared poised to
reject this long-standing doctrine in favor of an approach that affords
comprehensive and in-depth facial challenges of all agency action
that is of general and prospective application. This includes "as
such" review of all general practices of the United States administra-
tive agencies in the realm of antidumping and countervailing duties
measures.
By way of background, the doctrine that only mandatory laws
may be subject to an "as such" challenge is a well-established doc-
trine in WTO jurisprudence. 84 The essence of the doctrine provides
"that legislation which mandate[s] action inconsistent with the Gen-
eral Agreement could be challenged as such, whereas legislation
which merely gave the discretion to the executive authority of a con-
tracting party to act inconsistently with the General Agreement could
not be challenged as such . "85
The Appellate Body previously has described this doctrine as
a "practice" that "was developed by a number of GATT panels as a
threshold question in determining when legislation as such-rather
than a specific application of that legislation-was inconsistent with
[WTO] obligations." 86 As developed in numerous WTO panel and
83. William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded Its
Authority? A Consideration of Deference Shown by the System to Member Government
Decisions and Its Use of Issue-Avoidance Techniques, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 43, 63-65 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds.,
2003).
84. OESCH, supra note 22, at 190.
85. Appellate Body Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act
of 1998, 259, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002) (quoting Panel Report, United States
Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and Use of Tobacco, 118, BISD
41/S/I/133 (adopted Oct. 4, 1994)).
86. Appellate Body Report, United States-Anti-dumping Act of 1916, 88,
WT/DS136/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000).
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Appellate Body decisions, the key question under this doctrine is
whether discretion is vested in the executive branch of the govern-
ment of a Member State. 87 If it is, then agency action taken pursuant
to such discretion can only be reviewed for as applied violations of
WTO obligations.
There is strong theoretical support for such an approach. Its
rationale is that discretionary laws should be exempt from review by
WTO panels in order to respect a Member's legislative autonomy, al-
lowing it to delegate some decisions to its executive branch to apply
the law.88 A further rationale of the doctrine is that where discretion-
ary authority is vested in the executive branch, it cannot be assumed
that the Member State will fail to implement its obligation in good
faith.89 If the Member State fails to do so, an as applied challenge is
the appropriate response to correct the violation.
A key component in the analysis of the manda-
tory/discretionary doctrine is the locus of the mandatory obligation.
The WTO Appellate Body has been quite reluctant to identify man-
datory measures in non-statutory language embodied in court deci-
sions, administrative regulations, or interpretative instruments such
as the Statement of Administrative Action ("SAA"). 90 Thus, if a stat-
ute does not require a specific WTO-inconsistent methodology, the
fact that a domestic court, an administering authority, or the SAA in-
terpreted the statute as such does not render it inconsistent with WTO
obligations. 91 As one commentator put it, "unless the express word-
ing of a statute requires the authorities to act in a manner inconsistent
with a WTO obligation, the wording of a mandatory regulation con-
trary to that WTO obligation cannot be the basis for finding the stat-
ute ... in violation of that WTO obligation."
92
But in the US-Zeroing decision, the Appellate Body cast se-
rious doubt on the continued viability of the mandatory/discretionary
87. Id. 89, 100; see also OESCH, supra note 22, at 68, 190.
88. Yoshiko Naiki, The Mandatory/Discretionary Doctrine in WTO Law: The U.S.-
Section 301 Case and Its Aftermath, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 23, 59 (2004).
89. Panel Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, 7.62,
WT/DS273/R (Mar. 7, 2005).
90. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Countervailing Measures Concerning
Certain Products From the European Communities, 7 154-160, WT/DS212/AB/R (Dec. 9,
2002).
91. Id.; Panel Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, 77
9.127-28, WT/DS70/R (Apr. 14, 1999).
92. Naiki, supra note 88, at 65-66 nn.129-30 (citing Appellate Body Report, United
States-Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products
from Germany, 159-162, WT/DS213/AB/R (Nov. 28, 2002)); Panel Report, United
States-Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products
from Germany, TT 8.105-06, WT/DS213/R (July 3, 2002).
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doctrine. 93 Relying on the Appellate Body decision in US-Sunset
Review,94 it concluded that the Appellate Body has never pronounced
generally on the continuing relevance or significance of the manda-
tory/discretionary distinction and cautioned that application of that
distinction cannot be mechanistic. 95  The US-Zeroing Appellate
Body then proceeded to uphold the Panel decision without further
reference to the doctrine, simply concluding that the Panel made an
objective assessment based on the evidence that the zeroing method-
ology was inconsistent as such with Article 2.4.2.96
The difficulty with the Appellate Body's analysis is that the
previous decision in US-Sunset Review did not remotely reject the
mandatory/discretionary doctrine in the manner suggested by the
US-Zeroing decision. That decision continued to accept the doc-
trine as a useful analytical tool, and at most cast doubt on the wisdom
of excluding binding administrative measures from the scope of its
application. Specifically, in US-Sunset Review the Appellate Body
rejected the Panel's treatment of the administrative agency's Sunset
Policy Bulletin as a binding measure, stating that the Panel was defi-
cient in its failure to, inter alia, consider whether the bulletin was "a
legal instrument that operated so as to mandate a course of action,"
and whether the agency itself treated the bulletin as binding. 97 In
other words, the Appellate Body in that case was reconsidering the
definition of mandatory law to suggest that under that manda-
tory/discretionary doctrine, instruments need not be statutes to consti-
tute a binding measure that could be challenged "as such."
By contrast, in the US-Zeroing decision, the Appellate Body
appeared to jettison the doctrine altogether, suggesting that any iden-
tifiable government methodology that is of general and prospective
application can be subject to "any such" challenge. 98 Rather than
embrace the mandatory/discretionary doctrine, the Appellate Body
articulated a test for challenging measures that are of general and
prospective application:
[W]hen bringing a challenge against such a "rule or
norm" that constitutes a measure of general and pro-
spective application, a complaining party must clearly
establish, through arguments and supporting evidence,
at least that the alleged "rule or norm" is attributable
93. Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing, supra note 3, 210-14.




97. Appellate Body Report, US-Sunset Review, supra note 80, 99.
98. Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing, supra note 3, 198-99, 204.
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to the responding Member; its precise content; and in-
deed, that it does have general and prospective appli-
cation. It is only if the complaining part meets this
high threshold, and puts forward sufficient evidence
with respect to each of these elements, that a panel
would be in a position to find that the "rule or norm"
may be challenged, as such.99
It was of little moment that that measure may or may not be binding.
Thus, the Appellate Body has evolved in its jurisprudence
from embracing a well-established doctrine that limited "as such" re-
views to binding legislation, to an approach that allowed "as such"
reviews for other binding instruments (i.e., mandatory administrative
rules and regulations), to an approach in US-Zeroing that eschews
the mandatory/discretionary distinction altogether and permits "as
such" review of all methodologies that are of general and prospective
application. As a consequence, facial challenges once reserved for
provisions of binding legislation are now available for virtually any
general and prospective agency action.
The import of this evolution is obvious for the future of trade
disputes. A doctrine that once was a bulwark to shield discretionary
agency action from facial WTO review has been rejected in favor of
an approach that authorizes WTO panels effectively to review the
general practice of agencies as set forth in formal regulatory meas-
ures and informal methodologies. Whereas in the past provisions of
the United States Code were subject to WTO oversight for "as such"
violations, in the future provisions of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, statements in administrative agency bulletins, and strings in
government computer codes are all "general and prospective meas-
ures" that may be facially challenged.
Put differently, if the US-Zeroing decision is to be taken to
its logical conclusion, then the Appellate Body has announced that
WTO panels may now review the general practices of both the legis-
lative and executive branches for "as such" violations. In so doing,
the WTO Appellate Body has developed a theoretical basis for over-
coming the most significant hurdle to in-depth and comprehensive
review of U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty regulations, as
well as to challenges under other WTO Agreements.
Whereas federal courts under Chevron will defer to any
agency action that flows from a permissible interpretation of an am-
biguous federal statute, WTO panels under US-Zeroing are poised
to declare as facially invalid any general measure of an administra-
99, Id. 198.
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tive agency that runs afoul of their understanding of WTO obliga-
tions. Quite literally, the Appellate Body's decision in US-Zeroing
suggests that review of discretionary agency action will be more ro-
bust and searching when undertaken by an exacting international
body in Geneva than by a deferential federal court in New York. 100
V. CONCLUSION
It is well recognized that the WTO Appellate Body is not sub-
ject to significant controls as there is "nothing like a formal multilat-
eral control of its performance."' 0 1 But there is the horizontal pres-
sure that is applied when the international community "discusses the
activities of the WTO adjudicating bodies and through its writings
gives or denies its vote of confidence." 102 The Appellate Body's re-
port in US-Zeroing crystallizes some of the concerns that have been
expressed in the past regarding judicial excess in the WTO dispute
settlement regime. Since the report's adoption by the Dispute Set-
tlement Body on May 9, 2006, the United States has taken the un-
usual approach of writing two communications to WTO Members
detailing its serious legal objections to the Appellate Body's decision
and its corrosive effect on the dispute settlement system. 03 Those
communications underscore the disquiet with which the United States
greets the Appellate Body's approach to appellate review in this case.
That approach is one that ignores textual obligations to defer to ad-
ministering authorities, partakes in appellate fact-finding, and rejects
a well-established doctrine of justiciability. It most certainly does
not inspire confidence for the future of WTO dispute resolution.
100. See generally Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis, Concluding Remarks, in THE
ROLE OF THE JUDGE 1N INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION, supra note 83, at 353 (noting
that national and regional courts employ a higher degree of deference than panels and the
Appellate Body exercise under the DSU).
101. Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis, The Role of the Judge in International
Trade Regulation: An Overview, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
REGULATION, supra note 83, at 2.
102. Id.
103. See U.S. Communication of June 19, 2006, supra note 53; U.S. Communication of
May 17, 2006, supra note 53.
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